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This Article aims to add another piece to a so far still puzzling 
picture at the interface of intellectual property and antitrust laws.  While 
past and current discussions mostly revolve around the notion that only 
one—either Antitrust or IP laws—can prevail, the author favors a 
differentiated understanding. 
This Article compares how IP licensing is scrutinized by antitrust 
regimes in the European Union (EU) and the United States.  The result 
of that comparison leads to the conclusion that any attempted resolution 
of the IP-Antitrust “dilemma” will remain inadequate as long as it is 
“antitrust-based,” that is, regulated by antitrust laws or guidelines 
designed by antitrust-agencies.  Unlike by other current approaches, the 
overall validity of substantive antitrust concerns regarding IP licensing is 
not called into question, however. It is the institutional setup in which 
the antitrust policies regarding IP exploitation are designed and 
enforced that is proposed to be in need of change.  The author argues 
that antitrust concerns can and should be accounted for through proper 
construction and application of the IP laws themselves. 
The proposed “IP-based” approach to IP licensing is claimed to be 
beneficial in at least two respects:  it maintains the dogmatic clarity of 
the IP laws while preserving the bargain underlying the grant of 
intellectual property rights.  Furthermore, this Article suggests that an 
“IP-based” regulation of licensing activities will—despite initially 
increased costs—in the long run be more cost efficient than current 
approaches and therefore also be economically preferable. 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)1 confer exclusive rights to their 
owner.  This exclusivity of IPRs is often described as providing 
“monopoly-power,” which, were it true, would stand in opposition to 
antitrust legislation aiming at the control or even breakup of 
monopolies and at the promotion of competition.  It has been shown 
more than once, however, that this view on IPRs is based on a 
misconception of the term “monopoly.”2
1. For purposes of this Article “IPRs” refer to patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and 
know-how. 
2. See Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From 
Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 189 (1997); see also United States 
v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933); Tracy R. Lewis & Dennis A. Yao, 
Some Reflections on the Antitrust Treatment of Intellectual Property, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 
608 (1995). 
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Nevertheless, questions traditionally dealt with in antitrust laws 
frequently arise when IPRs are exploited, especially by licensing.  It is 
almost inherent in license agreements that the licensor imposes 
restrictions, for instance, as to the territory in which the licensee may 
use the IPR.  Such restrictions in general trade (e.g. sales or distribution 
contracts) have always been under antitrust scrutiny.  It appears logical, 
therefore, that IPR-licensing agreements containing such exclusivity 
restrictions should be subject to antitrust control as well.  The 
perception of the interplay between IP and antitrust has changed over 
the years.  It has rarely been called into question, however, that the 
legality of IP-licensing terms should be analyzed under antitrust laws. It 
further went unchallenged that the specialized agencies dealing with 
antitrust violations took on the task to review IP licenses. 
In 1995, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission (“the Agencies”) issued the Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property (“Antitrust Guidelines”).  These 
Guidelines state the general enforcement policy of the Agencies 
concerning IP licensing.3  Thereby the Agencies manifested their claim 
to scrutinize IP-licensing agreements. In the same spirit, the 
Commission of the European Union (“the Commission”) in 2004 issued 
a renewed “block exemption” regulation for certain technology-transfer 
agreements (“TTBER”).4 This regulation renders Article 81(1) of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community5 (“ECT”) inapplicable on 
certain kinds of IPR-licensing agreements.6  The mere fact that certain 
IP licenses are regulated in regard to Article 81(1) ECT establishes that 
the EU—like the United States—regards IPR licensing as an antitrust 
issue. 
However, court decisions in the United States as well as in Europe 
give reason to question this general assumption of the Agencies’ 
supervisory power over IP licenses.  In Lasercomb America, Inc. v. 
Reynolds,7 the court found that the analysis to prove copyright misuse is 
3. US DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1 (1995) [hereinafter Antitrust Guidelines]. 
4. Commission Regulation 772/2004 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (L 127) 11 (EC) [hereinafter 
TTBER].  This regulation replaced Regulation 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the Application 
of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 
1996 O.J. (L 031) (EC) [hereinafter TTBER 240/96]. 
5. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 29, 
2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 37 [hereinafter ECT]. 
6. TTBER, supra note 4. 
7. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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“similar to but separate from the analysis necessary to a finding of an 
antitrust violation.”8  This judgment could be read to suggest that 
although IPR licensing might touch on both antitrust and IP-law issues, 
the respective statutory regimes have a distinct realm of applicability.  
Once it has been determined which body of law prevails, only its 
distinctive tests must be employed.  With this reading, the Agencies 
might not be the authorities to issue general guidelines on the treatment 
or evaluation of IP licenses.  In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent 
Ink, Inc.,9 the Supreme Court ruled that an IPR10 does not of itself 
confer market power.11  Thereby it ruled out the “monopoly-
presumption” long held.  As a consequence, arguably, the Agencies now 
have to demonstrate a restraint of trade12 to justify antitrust scrutiny of 
IPR-licensing agreements.13
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has also established that the 
ownership of an IPR does not confer market power and that conduct 
that falls within the scope of an IPR—and this generally includes 
licensing—can never be reviewed in relation to antitrust laws.14  Thus, in 
both major IPR-producing jurisdictions, IP licensing is under the 
general scrutiny of the antitrust authorities despite the fact that, in both 
jurisdictions, courts have issued judgments suggesting that such a 
general antitrust scrutiny of IPR licenses might be misplaced. 
The interface of IPRs and antitrust laws as it appears in the context 
of license agreements should therefore be revisited.  It needs to be 
clarified if the Commission’s and the Agencies’ approaches are valid or 
if they unduly scrutinize legitimate practices of IPR owners.  The 
following analysis introduces the TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines 
and compares the legal status of both sets of rules including their scope 
and basic principles.  This comparison will first show if and to what 
extent the antitrust views on IPR exploitation vary between Europe and 
the United States.  Secondly, it will serve as a starting point for an 
8. Id. at 979 (emphasis added). 
9. 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
10. In this case a patent. 
11. 547 U.S. at 45.   
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  The exact meaning seems to be unclear; “restraint of 
trade” is often used as an umbrella term covering different types of anticompetitive behavior.  
For details, see PHILIPP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENCAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 93-99 (2d ed. 2000). 
13. Unless, of course, the parties are engaged in plainly anticompetitive behavior, for 
instance, the division of markets.  
14. See cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 
E.C.R. ¶ 48. 
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analysis of the merits of the Agencies’ and the Commission’s general 
approach.  It will be analyzed to what extent this approach is coherent 
with intellectual property law legislation.15  It will be suggested that the 
“external” antitrust perspective on IPR licensing agreements is legally 
questionable and unnecessary.  To remedy some of the perceived 
disadvantages identified in the current approach, a new, IP-driven 
approach to the analysis of IP licenses will be suggested.  This approach 
attempts to step away from the “isolated” application of the antitrust 
system and suggests an integrated regulatory system based on the 
specialized IP agencies and courts. 
I. TTBER AND ANTITRUST GUIDELINES 
The TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines both evaluate and limit 
IPR licensing from the antitrust perspective, i.e., guided by antitrust 
concerns and objectives.  Apart from this similarity, by their very nature 
(regulation vs. guideline) and due to the different jurisdictions they 
emerge from, the TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines form two 
distinct approaches to deal with the interface of antitrust laws and IPRs. 
A. Articles 81(1) and (3) ECT and Block Exemption Regulations 
To understand the different approaches, and especially the TTBER, 
one first has to consider the legal environment of the TTBER. 
Article 81(1) ECT prohibits all agreements between undertakings 
that may affect trade between member states and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition 
within the common market.  According to Article 81(3) ECT, an 
agreement is exempt from the prohibition of Article 81(1) ECT if it is 
beneficial for consumers.  To benefit consumers, the agreement must 
contribute to the improvement of production or distribution of goods or 
promote technical or economic progress. 
Prior to May 1, 2004, exemptions according to Article 81(3) ECT 
required an evaluation and a subsequent formal decision by the 
Commission.  This procedure was criticized for giving the Commission a 
monopoly on decisions about the antitrust relevance of agreements 
while producing enormous administrative costs.16  To reduce these costs 
and provide legal certainty for undertakings, the Council of the 
15. Obviously, no full comparative analysis is possible.  It is the underlying, generalized 
basis of IP laws that is compared. 
16. Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, Recital 3 [hereinafter Council 
Regulation 1/2003]. 
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European Union passed Regulation 19/65/EEC.17  In accordance with 
this regulation, the Commission could and did issue “block exemption 
regulations,” exempting categories of practices that are considered to 
normally be consistent with Article 81(1) ECT.18
Regulation (EC) 1/2003, which took effect May 1, 2004, brought 
about fundamental changes.  According to its Article 1(2), agreements 
that fall within the scope of Article 81(3) ECT are now automatically 
legal without prior evaluation by the Commission.  This change 
necessarily affected the block exemption regulations issued by the 
Commission.19  Prior to Regulation (EC) 1/2003, undertakings had to 
apply for exemption by the Commission even if they believed their 
agreement to be “block exempted.”20  Now, the possibility to obtain a 
formal exemption is unavailable.  Unlike in the United States, there is 
furthermore no option to obtain an (non-binding) informal evaluation 
of the validity of a license agreement.21  According to the new legislative 
approach they are unnecessary anyway. 
The flipside of this new approach is that the undertakings bear a 
heavy burden of legal uncertainty.  They have to determine and 
evaluate all factors relevant for the analysis of Article 81(3) ECT as well 
as the factors concerning the applicability of a block exemption.  Should 
the determination by the undertakings differ from a subsequent 
evaluation by the Commission (for example, in the course of antitrust 
litigation), the agreement will be declared void due to a violation of 
Article 81(1) ECT. 
17. Council Regulation 19/65/EEC, 1965-1966 O.J. SPEC. ED. (36) 1 [hereinafter 
Council Regulation 19/65/EEC]. 
18. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1475/95 On the Application of Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty of Certain Categories of Motor Vehicle Distribution and Service Agreements, 
1995 O.J. (L 145) 1; Commission Regulation 2790/1999, On the Application of Article 81(3) 
of the Treaty to Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 O.J. (L 336). 
19. Josef Drexl, Die neue Gruppenfreistellungsverordnung für Technologietransfer-
Vereinbarungen im Spannungsfeld von Ökonomisierung und Rechtssicherheit, GRUR INT. 716, 
719 (2004) (legitimately questions if after Regulation 1/2003 the block exemption regulations 
are still necessary, as all agreements within the scope of Article 81(3) ECT are automatically 
exempt).  
20. In practice most undertakings, instead of applying for such exemption, relied on the 
informal, but much faster, “comfort-letters” by which the Commission acknowledged that, by 
the facts presented, it would not object to the agreement.  See KNUT W. LANGE, HANDBUCH 
ZUM DEUTSCHEN UND EUROPÄISCHEN KARTELLRECHT, 192 (2001). 
21. For the United States, see 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2006), 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4 (2007).  In 
the EU the availability of comfort letters is unclear.  Compare VALENTINE KORAH, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES 26 (2006) (implying 
a general availability of comfort letters), with Johannes Zöttl, Das neue EG-Kartellrecht für 
Technologietransferverträge, WRP 33, 46 (2005) (F.R.G.) (arguing against the availability). 
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B. The New TTBER 
Within this new general framework, on May 1, 2004, the new 
TTBER came into effect.22  It replaced the previous block exemption 
from 1996 and introduced the Commission’s “more economic,” i.e., 
economic-based approach, to IPR licensing.23  The TTBER is based on 
three different assumptions.  First, the Commission is of the opinion 
that intellectual property laws and competition laws share the basic 
objective of promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of 
resources.24  Second, the IPR owner must not be unduly restricted in the 
exploitation of his IPRs so as to allow him to recover sufficient 
monetary gain including recovery of sunk costs.25  Third, there is no 
presumption that IPR licensing as such gives rise to competition law 
concerns.26  To the contrary, “[t]echnology transfer agreements can give 
rise to economic efficiencies that outweigh the negative impact of 
restrictions that might be indispensable to the attainment of such 
efficiencies.”27
According to Article 2(1) TTBER, only technology transfer 
agreements between two undertakings can be block exempted.  Multi-
party agreements fall outside the scope of the TTBER.28  Furthermore, 
a technology-transfer agreement must concern the production of 
“contract products”—that is, goods or services which are produced with 
or incorporate the licensed technology.29  If the main purpose of an 
agreement is not the production and distribution of a contract product, 
the agreement falls outside the scope of the TTBER.30
The TTBER only covers license agreements concerning patents, 
know-how, mixed patent/know-how agreements, design rights, and 
22. In conjunction with the TTBER, the Commission issued the Commission Notice 
C/2004, 2004 O.J. (C101/2) Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to 
technology transfer agreements [hereinafter “Commission Guidelines”].  Its purpose is “to 
provide guidance on the application of the TTBER.”  See id. at I.7. 
23. See TTBER, supra note 4, Recital 4 (the influence of economics to European laws 
on antitrust); see Drexl, supra note 19, at 717.  
24. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 7. 
25. Id. ¶ at 8. 
26. See id. at ¶ 35. 
27. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 35. 
28. Under Council Regulation 19/65 EEC, supra note 17, at 35.  The Commission is not 
empowered to block exempt technology transfer agreements concluded between more than 
two undertakings.  Id. 
29. See TTBER, supra note 4, art. 1 lit. f.; Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 41. 
30. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶¶ 41, 45.  
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software.31 Agreements merely relating to trademark or copyright 
licensing (except for software) are not covered by the TTBER.32
Within this framework the new TTBER provides a “safe harbor” in 
which licensing agreements will not be challenged for antitrust reasons.  
This safety zone exists upon two conditions:  first, it requires certain 
market-share thresholds not to be exceeded by the contracting parties; 
second, the agreement must not include any of the so called “hardcore 
restrictions” exhaustively listed in Article 4 TTBER.  If one of these 
requirements is not met, the entire agreement lies outside of the safe 
harbor and is subject to individual assessment under Article 81(1), (3) 
ECT.33  Even worse, the inclusion of a hardcore restriction will in most 
cases render the entire agreement void.34
Article 5 TTBER finally contains so-called “excluded restrictions.”  
Agreements containing those clauses will not be void in their entirety.  
Only the specific term will require individual assessment in light of 
Article 81(1), (3) ECT.35
1. Market-Share Thresholds 
The Commission believes that an agreement’s impact on the market 
is insignificant if the parties have no substantial market power.36  A 
collective market share up to twenty percent if the contracting parties 
are competitors and thirty percent if they are not competitors is 
regarded as insubstantial market power.37  The inclusion of market-
share thresholds is motivated by the Commission’s “economic-based 
approach” that bases the exemption of an agreement on the assessment 
of its impact on the relevant market.38  The relevant market for purposes 
of the TTBER is determined according to the rules set forth in the 
market-definition guidelines.39  The TTBER therefore follows the 
demand-market principle:  goods or services that are substitutable from 
31. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 1(1)(b). 
32. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 50. 
33. Just because an agreement does not fall within the scope of the TTBER does not, 
on the other hand, allow for the presumption that it constitutes an antitrust violation 
according to Article 81(1) ECT.  See TTBER, supra note 4, Recital 12. 
34. See TTBER, supra note 4, art. 4(1), (2); Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 
75. 
35. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 107. 
36. TTBER, supra note 4, Recitals 4, 10, and 11. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. TTBER, supra note 4 at Recital 4.  
39. Commission Notice 97/C, 1997 O.J. (C372) 5.  See Commission Guidelines, supra 
note 22, ¶ 19. 
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the consumer’s perspective as to their quality, usability, and price, 
constitute the relevant market.40  The same test applies for technology 
markets. 
2. Hardcore Restrictions—Article 4 TTBER 
Technology-transfer agreements must not include any of the so-
called “hardcore” restrictions exhaustively listed in Article 4 TTBER in 
order to qualify for block exemption.41  The agreement of any of these 
terms will render the entire transfer agreement void unless it qualifies 
for individual exemption under Article 81(3) ECT.  The Commission 
has made clear, however, that in its opinion, a hardcore restriction will 
only in exceptional circumstances be in line with the requirements of 
Article 81(3) ECT.42
Article 4 TTBER differentiates between hardcore restrictions in 
agreements between competing undertakings43 and such between not 
competing undertakings.44  In addition, Article 4(1) TTBER further 
distinguishes between reciprocal and non-reciprocal agreements.  As 
reciprocal agreements between competing undertakings pose a 
substantial threat to competition, these agreements face the highest 
level of antitrust scrutiny.45  The Commission treats non-reciprocal 
agreements more gently.46  It considers those terms to oftentimes be in 
line with the objective of IPRs. They can protect legitimate interests of 
the parties even if they are competitors.47
Article 4(1) TTBER prohibits competing undertakings from 
agreeing on fixed resale prices,48 output restrictions,49 allocation of 
markets or customers,50 and the restriction of use of licensee’s own 
technology.51  The prohibited allocation of markets or customers 
40. See, e.g., AREEDA, supra note 12, IIA, § 530a. 
41. The former TTBER 240/96 contained a “black list” of forbidden clauses and a 
“white list” of those terms generally acceptable.  Thus, some commentators have also labeled 
Article 4 TTBER “black listed” provision to stress the new approach the Commission takes 
with this TTBER, one should refrain, however, from using the old terminology. 
42. Id. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶¶ 18, 75. 
43. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 4(1). 
44. Id. at art. 4(2). 
45. See id. at ¶ 78. 
46. Id. at ¶83. 
47. See id. at ¶ 83. 
48. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 4(1) lit. a. 
49. Id. at art. 4(1) lit. b. 
50. Id. at art. 4(1) lit. c. 
51. Id. at art. 4(1) lit. d. 
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contains seven exceptions that mirror some of the typical problems 
arising at the interface of antitrust laws and IPRs. 
According to Article 4(1)(c)(i) TTBER, field-of-use restrictions do 
not form a hardcore restriction and are exempted within the market 
share threshold of twenty percent according to Article 2 TTBER.52  
Articles 4(1)(c)(ii) and (iii) TTBER exempt certain exclusive and sole 
licenses.53  Reciprocal exclusive licenses are always prohibited; non-
reciprocal exclusive licenses are exempted within the market-share 
threshold of twenty percent.  Sole licenses are always exempted 
irrespective of their nature as reciprocal or non-reciprocal licenses.  
Furthermore, sales restrictions, captive use, and second source 
limitations can be exempted.54
Article 4(2) TTBER lists price restrictions, territorial restrictions on 
the licensee, and restrictions on active or passive sales to end-users by a 
licensee who sells by retail, as prohibited agreements between non-
competing undertakings.55  The territorial restrictions are not absolute, 
however, but include a number of exceptions.  Broadly speaking, 
passive sales into territories or to customer groups exclusive to the 
licensor do not form a hardcore violation.56  Furthermore, the limitation 
to production for the licensee’s own use, including distribution as spare 
parts, is consistent with EU competition law.57  Sales provisions aimed at 
the protection of certain distributive systems are exempted by virtue of 
Articles 4(2)(b)(iv), (v), and (vi).58
3. Excluded restrictions—Article 5 TTBER 
The Commission excludes certain provisions from the block 
exemption.  These provisions are potentially harmful to competition, 
although there is no presumption of anti-competitiveness.59  The terms 
may or may not infringe Article 81(1) ECT.  If they do, they are invalid 
and unenforceable.  The difference between these and the “hardcore 
52. See Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 90; Volker Schumacher & Christoph 
Schmid, Die neue Gruppenfreistellungsverordung für Technelogietransfer-Vereinbarungen, 
GRUR 1, 8 (2006). 
53. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 4(1)(c)(i)-(iii); see Commission Guidelines, supra note 
25, ¶¶ 87, 89. 
54. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 4(1)(c)(iv)-(vii). 
55. Id. at art. 4(2)(a)-(c). 
56. Id. at art. 4(2)(b)(i)-(ii). 
57. Id. at art. 4(2)(b)(iii). 
58. Id. at art. 4(2)(b)(iv)-(vi). 
59. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 107. 
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restrictions” in Article 4 TTBER is that an excluded provision will not 
“infect” the entire agreement.  The respective clause is invalid; the 
remainder of the contract will stay in force.  Again, the assessment of 
whether an excluded term is coherent with Article 81(1) ECT lies with 
the undertakings.60
Article 5(1) TTBER is concerned with grant-back clauses and non-
challenge-provisions,61 while Article 5(2) TTBER prohibits terms that 
inhibit a licensee from exploiting his own technology or limit his ability 
to do research and development.62  According to Articles 5(1)(a) and 
(b) TTBER, the licensee must not be obliged to either grant an 
exclusive license or to even transfer severable improvements (as defined 
in Article 1(1)(n) TTBER) to the licensor or any third party designated 
by him.63  This stems from the presumption that the licensee will have 
no incentive to invest in improving the technology if he cannot himself 
exploit such improvements.64  Any such clause is therefore seen to 
directly inhibit innovation.  While this is the general assumption, one 
must not forget that any of the excluded provisions are subject to 
individual assessment under Articles 81(1) and (3) ECT.65  Therefore, 
other factors may exist in the individual case that render such a clause 
permissible.  One of these “positive” criteria is consideration.66  The 
payment of consideration as such will not go so far as to create the 
presumption that an exclusive grant-back clause does not violate Article 
81(1) ECT.67  However, the Commission rightly acknowledges that with 
the prospect of adequate remuneration, a licensor might very well be 
willing to further the licensed technology and thus promote 
innovation.68
Besides possible payments, the general market position of the 
licensor can determine permissibility of a grant-back clause.69  The 
stronger the licensor’s position in the market, the more important the 
60. Id. 
61. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 5(1)(a)-(c). 
62. Id. at art. 5(2). 
63. Id. at art. 5(1)(a)-(b). 
64. See Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 109. 
65. See ECT, supra note 5. 
66. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 110. 
67. See id. 
68. Id.  While consideration is irrelevant in the regulation itself, its mention in the 
Guidelines nevertheless forms a clear turnaround in the Commission’s attitude.  Cf. KORAH, 
supra note 23 at 69.  In Velcro SA v. Aplix SA, the Commission ignored a provision for paying 
reasonable compensation for grant-back of improvements.  Case 410/85, 4C MLR 157 (1985). 
69. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 110. 
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licensee’s potential for innovation becomes.70  If the licensor is in a 
strong market position, exclusive grant-back clauses may therefore 
harmfully limit competition.71
Article 5(1)(c) TTBER is concerned with non-challenge provisions.72 
The parties are not precluded from agreeing on a termination right in 
case the licensee challenges the IPR’s validity.73  The licensor shall not 
be forced to maintain a contractual relationship with a party aiming to 
destroy the basis of their contract.74  On the other hand, the Commission 
does not allow an undertaking to draw competitive advantages from 
invalid IPRs.75  A licensee must therefore be able to act as any 
uninvolved third party and be able to eliminate unjustified IPR-induced 
protection from the market.76
Article 5(2) TTBER prohibits terms that inhibit a licensee from 
exploiting its own technology or limit his ability to do research and 
development.77  Thus, this provision ensures that a licensee can freely 
use and develop his own technology.  As opposed to Article 4(1)(d) 
TTBER, which contains the same provision, Article 5(2) is aimed at 
non-competing undertakings.78  As can be seen from the categorization 
as an “excluded provision,” the Commission feels less strongly about 
such limitations between non-competing undertakings.79  Nevertheless, 
they are not exempted. 
4. Analysis 
The TTBER is subject to different substantive and institutional 
points of critique. 
a.  Substantive Issues 
The reliance on market share thresholds has been widely criticized 
as early as in the drafting stages of the TTBER80 while it has been 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 5(1)(c). 
73. See id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 112. 
77. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 5(2). 
78. Id. at arts. 4(1)(d), 5(2). 
79. See also KORAH, supra note 21, at 70. 
80. See Competition Law of Licensing Agreements Working Group, The Max Planck 
Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Commentary, On the Draft 
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simultaneously acknowledged that as of today no better approach is at 
hand.81  Nonetheless, the problem remains that a new product or 
technology may create a new market.  The IPR owner thereby would 
hold a market share of 100 percent, which from the very start would 
exclude him from the benefits of the TTBER if he chose to license his 
IPR.  Furthermore, while for “normal” products the market share is 
already difficult to determine,82 this is even more so with regard to 
technology or other subject matter of IPRs.  From the outside, it will 
hardly be possible to determine the different parts or details of a new 
technology and, even less so, its substitutability with others’ or one’s 
own technologies.  Thus, mere inability to determine the market share 
might already pose an insurmountable hurdle for IPR owners to benefit 
from the TTBER. 
Within the scope of the TTBER, the antitrust view on IP licensing 
leads to hardly understandable results.  For instance, according to 
Article 4(1)(c)(i) TTBER, field-of-use restrictions between competitors 
do not form a hardcore restriction and, thus, are exempted within the 
market-share threshold of 20 percent according to Article 2 TTBER.83  
The argumentum e contrario then would be that beyond that market 
share a field-of-use clause could or would form a restriction subject to 
antitrust scrutiny.84  It is questionable, however, if a field-of-use 
restriction even is a restraint of competition that needs exemption 
according to Article 81(3) ECT.  In the preceding regulation, (EC) 
240/96, the Commission expressly held the opinion that field-of-use 
restrictions were “generally not restrictive of competition.”85  
Nevertheless, the argumentum e contrario set out above suggests that 
the Commission has changed its view. 
Such change of opinion might give rise to the objection of undue 
interference with national legislation.  According to the national laws, 
IPRs confer upon their owner exclusive rights, which include the right to 
Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of 
Technology Transfer Agreements, and on the Draft Guidelines on the Application of Article 
81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements, 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/technology_transfer_2/max_planck_en.pdf  
81. See id. at ¶ 5. 
82. See, e.g., Richard Gilbert, Converging Doctrines? US and EU Antitrust Policy for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property, Competition Policy Center, Paper CPC04-044, 11 
(2004), http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC04-044 (Oct. 20, 2007). 
83. TTBER, supra note 4, arts. 2, 4(1)(c)(i). 
84. Although this need not necessarily result in invalidity, the mere subjectivity to 
antitrust-scrutiny is—at least from a libertarian point of view—burdensome. 
85. TTBER 240/96, supra note 4, arts. 2(1), (8) and Recital 22. 
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grant exclusive or non-exclusive licenses.  Both types of licenses can 
limit the licensee to a specified form or field of use.  Any violation of a 
lawful limitation is subject to injunctive relief by the licensor.86  If now 
with the suggested argumentum e contrario the Commission would 
scrutinize field-of-use clauses in licensing agreements, it would arguably 
second guess national legislation. 
It is furthermore troublesome that the Commission will exempt 
licenses that include “hardcore restrictions” only in exceptional 
circumstances.  This static view neglects that most technology licensing 
is pro-competitive and can generate efficiencies, promote innovation, 
and benefit consumers—an assessment presumably shared by the 
Commission.87
b.  Institutional Issues 
From an institutional point of view, the Commission’s antitrust 
approach to IP licensing is problematic in two respects.  First, the 
TTBER provides for a shift of the burden of proof that is contrary to IP 
laws.  Generally, under IP laws, the challenging party (i.e., a frustrated 
contracting party/licensee or third party) carries the burden of proof to 
establish invalidity, unenforceability, or other improper conduct.88  
Under the TTBER, the Commission puts the heavy burden of proof 
required by Article 81(3) ECT on the party alleging legality of the 
agreement.89
The IPR owner now has to prove the legality of the planned 
measure.90  This includes an analysis of the relevant markets and the 
market shares of all market participants in the relevant market.  The 
difficulties to define the relevant markets and market shares, especially 
in the IP context, have been described above.  A shift in the burden of 
proof might deter an IP owner from licensing his rights.  The shift, 
therefore, potentially stifles licensing and the dissemination of 
technology, thus defeating the purpose of the TTBER.  On a broader 
86. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000); Patentgesetz [German Patent Act] § 15(2) (1998). 
87. See Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 7. 
88. Although “misuse” would be an example, this label was avoided as it might not fit 
all European IP-law regimes. 
89. See KORAH, supra note 21, at 171. 
90. The opposite situation is possible, too, however.  The IPR owner might want to end 
a license agreement and could challenge its compliance with Article 81 ECT.  In that case it 
might be beneficial that the licensee carries the burden of proof.  As this situation does not 
reflect the IPR owner’s will to exploit his right but rather to retain it, it is not further 
considered. 
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legislative level, it is also questionable if this shift in the burden of proof 
is reconcilable with national IP legislation or introduces a de facto 
legislative change of national laws inconsistent with the division of 
powers in the EU. 
Secondly, the burden of proof seems to affect costs for the IPR 
owner.  Pre-exploitation assessment of legality now includes an in-depth 
market analysis as well as a rather detailed analysis of the contract’s 
implications on these markets.  If IP laws mandated the first part of this 
analysis (i.e., market analysis) at all, it would not have to be as detailed.  
The additional costs resulting from this expanded analysis limit the 
revenues that the IPR owner can reap from his right.  Depending on the 
field of technology, costs might even “eat up” the attainable licensing 
fees.  Again, the Commission’s approach potentially counteracts 
national IP legislation in effectively limiting the reward an IP owner can 
obtain. 
5. Conclusion 
In sum, it appears that the Commission did not find a proper balance 
of interests.  Its antitrust-based approach appears to be static, neglecting 
important pro-competitive aspects of IP licensing.  It also potentially 
interferes with national IP legislation by shifting the burden to prove 
validity of a license agreement to the IP owner. 
C. U.S. Antitrust Guidelines 
The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines provide a general framework of 
antitrust concerns that could be raised by IP-license agreements.  To 
fully understand the importance of the Guidelines one must bear in 
mind their development and the prior attitude in the United States 
towards IPR licensing. 
1. Antitrust Challenges to IP Licensing Prior to 1995 
Despite the general impact the Sherman Act of 189091 had on 
corporations, it did not initially affect the holders of IPRs in their 
licensing activities.92  It was believed that IPRs, as “private property,” 
entitled their holders to almost unfettered discretion.93  This discretion 
extended to licensing and licensing restraints in particular.94
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000). 
92. Tom & Newberg, supra note 2, at 168-69. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
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If challenged, licensing restraints typically fell within the “freedom 
of contract.”95  This view is clearly expressed by the Supreme Court in 
Bement and Sons v. National Harrow Co.,96 where it stated that “the 
general rule is absolute freedom . . . .  [A]ny conditions which are not in 
their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property . . . will be 
upheld by the courts.  The fact that the conditions in the contracts keep 
up the monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal.”97  Thus, at 
this very early age, IPRs were actually upheld to a level of almost 
sacrosanct existence. 
Beginning in 1913, however, the Supreme Court subjected IPRs to 
the “general law,”98 including the “positive prohibitions” of the 
Sherman Act.99  This new interpretation observed a tension between 
antitrust laws and IPRs.  This tension was based on the presumption 
that IPRs confer upon their holders a “monopoly,” while the Sherman 
Act aims to break up monopolistic structures and their anticompetitive 
effects.100  But, as it was the perceived purpose of the grant, the patent 
“monopoly” was seen as “lawful.”101  Any conduct permitted by this 
lawful monopoly was therefore within a sphere of law that was strictly 
separate from antitrust.  With this “separate spheres” theory, the 
monopoly power of the holder of an IPR was limited only in a 
formalistic sense by the “metes and bounds” of the respective IPR.102  
Once the IP holder overstepped these boundaries, he subjected himself 
to antitrust scrutiny, however. 
Paradigmatic of this period were the “Nine No No’s” established by 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in 1970.  Those were 
nine intellectual property licensing practices—oftentimes derived from 
prior case law—that were “out of bounds” and would therefore attract 
the scrutiny of the Agencies.103  Although they have never clearly been 
labeled as per se violations of antitrust laws, those practices were 
described to lead “in virtually all cases . . . to antitrust trouble because 
95. Id. at 169. 
96. 186 U.S. 70 (1902). 
97. Id. at 91. 
98. Motion Picture Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., Co., 243 U.S. 502, 513 (1917). 
99. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1913). 
100. Tom & Newberg, supra note 2, at 170-71. 
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of their adverse effect upon competition.”104  The “No No’s” were as 
follows: 
 
1. tying of unpatented supplies, 
2. mandatory grantbacks, 
3. post-sale restrictions on resale, 
4. tie-outs, 
5. licensee veto power over licensor’s grant of further licenses, 
6. mandatory package licensing, 
7. compulsory payment of royalties in amounts not reasonably 
related to sales of the patented product, 
8. restrictions on sales of unpatented products made by a 
patented process, and 
9. specifying prices chargeable on resale of licensed products. 105 
 
A series of subsequent federal court decisions, legislative changes, 
and changes in antitrust analysis106 called the basis of the “separate 
spheres” theory and the validity of the “No No’s” into question.  The 
Supreme Court judgments in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc.107 and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc.108 may be highlighted as a turning point.109  In its judgments, the 
Supreme Court analyzed the substance, i.e., the actual effects the 
challenged clauses had on competition.  It furthermore expanded the 
scope of the rule of reason.110
2. 1995 U.S. Antitrust Guidelines 
The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines are highly influenced by this Supreme 
Court’s new approach to antitrust analysis, which is especially evident in 
the three presumptions the guidelines are based on:  (1) Intellectual 
Property is essentially comparable to any other kind of property; (2) 
104. Id. at 179. 
105. Id. at 179-80. 
106. See id. at 189. 
107. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (involving a territorial restraint in a franchise agreement 
challenged to constitute a per se violation of Section 1 Sherman Act). 
108. 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (involving a blanket license that allegedly amounted to per se 
unlawful price fixing). 
109. Tom & Newberg, supra note 2, at 189-91. 
110. Id. at 194.  The rule of reason is explained infra Part I.C.2.a. 
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IPRs do not create market power in the antitrust context;111 and (3) 
licensing is generally pro-competitive.112  The Agencies expressly state 
that IPRs and antitrust laws “share the common purpose of promoting 
innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.”113
The Antitrust Guidelines address licensing of copyrights, patents, 
trade secrets and know-how.114  Trademark licenses are excluded from 
its scope.115  The Agencies believe that, as with other property, certain 
types of conduct with respect to IPRs may have anticompetitive effects.  
Thus, they apply general antitrust principles to IPR-licensing 
agreements.  Agreements concerning IPRs are, therefore, neither free 
from antitrust scrutiny nor particularly suspect under antitrust laws.116
The Agencies express their concern that IPR licensing might 
facilitate market division or harm competition for the development of 
new goods and services.  Furthermore, they point out that license 
agreements could foreclose access to a market, raise prices, or, through 
coordinated practice, reduce output for a certain product.117
In their evaluation of IPR licenses, the Agencies consider the 
license’s impact on goods markets, technology markets,118 and 
innovation markets.119  The Agencies stress that they will analyze 
agreements based on their anticompetitive effects, not their 
formalities.120  Assessment of the lawfulness is based on the “classic” 
standards in antitrust law:  the rule of reason and the per se rule.121  To 
determine which test is applicable under the circumstances, the 
Agencies assess whether the restraint in question can be expected to 
111. While in 1995 this was not more than the opinion of law of two federal agencies, 
this view has since been affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held in Illinois Tool 
Works v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006), that a patent does not necessarily confer market 
power. 
112. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 2.0, at 2. 
113. Id. § 1.0, at 2. 
114. Id. § 1.0, at 1. 
115. Id. § 1.0, at n.1. 
116. See id. § 2.1, at 3. 
117. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 3.1, at 7. 
118. Technology markets consist of the intellectual property that is licensed and its 
close substitutes.  Id. § 3.2.2, at 8. 
119. Innovation markets become relevant where arrangements concern research and 
development and the (not yet existing) product cannot be assigned to a certain goods market.  
Id. § 3.2.3, at 10-11. 
120. Id. § 3.1, at 7. 
121. The per se rule will not further be explained.  According to this rule certain 
clauses are presumed to be anticompetitive regardless of the circumstances.  Thus, they are 
always prohibited and void without further analysis. 
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contribute to an “efficiency-enhancing integration of economic 
activity,”122 that is, whether the respective term helps the parties to 
produce goods or render services more efficiently. 
a.  The Rule of Reason 
According to the Agencies, the “vast majority” of agreements will be 
evaluated under the rule of reason standard.123  This test inquires into 
the likelihood of anticompetitive effects of an agreement.124  If a 
restraint is found to likely cause anticompetitive effects, it is further 
asked if this restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve pro-competitive 
benefits that outweigh the restriction of competition.125  Even where a 
term is found to be obviously anticompetitive, the rule of reason may 
still apply if the overall effect of the clause is efficiency enhancing.126
Generally, the rule of reason analysis requires a comprehensive 
market inquiry.127 Nevertheless, the Agencies reserve the freedom to 
truncate this test where a restraint has no likely anticompetitive effect 
(in which case the clause will be evaluated as reasonable) and where a 
restraint facially appears to always or almost always cause 
anticompetitive results without equally enhancing efficiency (in which 
case the clause will be treated under the per se rule). 
b. Differentiation between Horizontal and Vertical Relationships of 
Licensing Parties 
In the assessment of typical threats to competition arising from 
license agreements, the Agencies differentiate between contracting 
parties in a horizontal relationship (i.e., competitors) and parties in a 
vertical relationship (i.e., non-competing undertakings).128
Licensing agreements between competitors might often lead to or 
even aim at the following:  coordinated pricing, output restrictions, 
acquisition or maintenance of market power, and retarding or restricting 
the development of new or improved goods or processes.129  Agreements 
between parties in a vertical relationship may, especially in connection 
122. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 3.4, at 16. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. See Fed. Trade Comm’n  v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1985). 
126. Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 16-24. 
127. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, at 16. 
128. Id. § 3.3, at 13. 
129. Id. § 4.1.1, at 18. 
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with IPR licenses, often provide complementaries, and thus further 
innovation and competition.130  On the other hand, they may also affect 
competition in horizontal relationships either on the level of the licensor 
or on the licensee’s level.  The threats include foreclosure of access, 
increased costs for inputs, coordination or increase of prices, or 
restriction of output.131
For both kinds of agreements, the Agencies acknowledge that the 
actual competitive effect is dependent on the structure of the relevant 
market.132  Therefore, the difficulty to enter the market, the degree of 
concentration in the market, and the responsiveness of supply and 
demand to changes in price may affect the analysis.133  Moreover, in 
assessing a license term the Agencies also consider its duration134 and 
the proportion of the markets the restraint affects.135  The antitrust 
evaluation of certain restraints may vary where a net of similar 
restraints is set up in a market.  While such nets of similar restraints may 
be common and pro-competitive in one industry, they may well be 
anticompetitive in another market.136
c.  Licensing Arrangements Involving Exclusivity 
The Agencies identify exclusive licenses and exclusive dealing 
provisions as agreements especially susceptible to raising antitrust 
concerns.137
Exclusive licenses restrict the right of the licensor to license to others 
and possibly also to use the technology himself.  They pose a threat to 
competition where the parties are in a horizontal relationship.138  
Examples of such clauses that are examined under the rule of reason 
analysis are cross licensing by parties collectively possessing market 
power and grant-backs.139
“Exclusive dealing” describes clauses that limit a licensee in 
licensing, selling, distributing, or using technology that competes with 
130. See Tom & Newberg, supra note 2, at 203. 
131. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.1.1, at 18-19. 
132. Id. § 4.1.1, at 18. 
133. Id.  (by employing these criteria the Agencies rely on the U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE 
& FED. TRADE COMM’N, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 1.5, at 3.) 
134. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.1.1, at 19. 
135. Id. § 4.1.1, at 18. 
136. Id. § 4.1.1, at 19. 
137. Id. § 4.1.1, at 19-20. 
138. Id. § 4.1.2, at 19. 
139. Id. 
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the licensed technology.140  These terms may negatively impact 
competition as they can foreclose market access or increase costs and 
reduce output.  On the other hand, they may (pro-competitively) 
encourage a licensee to invest in research and development to further 
the licensed technology or specialized applications thereto.141
The Agencies point out that some of the just-named principles and 
considerations are similar to those applied for evaluation of vertical 
restraints outside the licensing context.142  They stress, however, that in 
the IP-licensing context the outcome of these considerations may vary, 
as the risks to IPRs may justify some restrictions that are inadmissible in 
another context.143
d. Efficiencies and Justifications 
If restrictions in an IP license agreement, after consideration of the 
relevant market factors as described above, are unlikely to negatively 
influence the market, the Agencies will not challenge the clause.144  If 
they find anticompetitive potential, however, they will balance these 
anticompetitive effects with possible pro-competitive effects derived 
from the restriction.  If the restriction is after all “reasonably necessary” 
to achieve pro-competitive efficiencies, it will remain intact.145
The anti- and pro-competitive effects are reciprocal:  the more 
efficiency-enhancing a clause is, the more restrictions on competition 
may be bearable.  Conversely, even terms that significantly restrict 
competition in a certain market may be acceptable upon proof of the 
necessity of such clause due to the specifics of the relevant market or 
industry.146
As the Agencies take a practical, effects-based approach in their 
evaluation, the context of the agreement is of vital importance.  Thus, 
proportionality becomes an issue as well.  The objective of a certain 
restriction might generally be pro-competitive; if there are less 
restrictive means, however, by which the same results could be 
achieved, the provision will be challenged.  The Agencies stress that 
only “realistic alternatives” will be taken into account, not theoretically 
140. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
141. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.1.2, at 20. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. § 4.2, at 21. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
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less restrictive clauses that are inapplicable in the business situation 
faced by the parties.147
Proportionality considerations can be influenced by limited 
durations of a certain restriction.148  An anticompetitive restraint may be 
important and justified for a limited period of time to protect interests 
of the licensor, for example.  Although the Agencies acknowledge that 
they will refrain from drawing fine distinctions on the question of 
duration, they will focus on durations that “clearly exceed[] the period 
needed to achieve the procompetitive efficiency.”149
e. Antitrust “Safety Zone” 
Following the general idea that licensing of IPRs can promote 
innovation and is generally pro-competitive, the Agencies want to 
provide “some certainty” as to cases that do not face antitrust 
concerns.150  To that end, the Agencies provide “safety zones.”151  Within 
these zones, an agreement will not be challenged by the Agencies for 
antitrust reasons.  The argumentum e contrario does not work, however.  
The mere fact that an agreement falls outside the scope of a safety zone 
does not imply its unlawfulness.152  It then is merely subject to antitrust 
scrutiny according to the rules set out above.153
The “safety zones” provide for the following:  In the absence of 
“extraordinary circumstances,” the Agencies will not challenge an 
agreement if “(1) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive and (2) the 
licensor and its licensees collectively account for no more than twenty 
percent of each relevant market significantly affected by the 
restraint.”154  For the calculation of the market share, only the goods 
markets will be determinative unless in the specific instance technology 
markets are so important that without reference to them the effects of 
the licensing arrangements would be inadequately addressed.155
If mainly technology markets or innovation markets are concerned, 
the second element of the test is changed and substituted by a “four-
plus” test.  If there are four or more independently controlled 
147. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.2, at 21. 
148. Id. § 4.2, at 22. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. § 4.3, at 22. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. § 4.3, at 23. 
153. See id.  See also supra Part I.C.2.a. 
154. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.3, at 22. 
155. Id. § 4.3, at 23. 
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technologies in addition to the technologies controlled by the parties, 
and those technologies are substitutable for the licensed technology at 
comparable costs, licensing restraints affecting a technology market will 
not be challenged.156
3. Analysis 
Having outlined the rule of reason approach as set forth in the 
Antitrust Guidelines, it still is unclear exactly how clauses are evaluated.  
The test does not propose elements that undertakings could employ to 
narrow down the probable evaluation by the agencies.  It does not even 
clarify when the rule of reason standard is applied. 
Naked price fixing for instance, is, according to the Agencies, a 
facially anticompetitive restraint.157  Generally, such clause would be 
unlawful per se.  The Agencies suggest, however, that this is only the 
case where there is no efficiency-enhancing integration of economic 
activity.158  If, however, the opposite holds true, that is, an overall pro-
competitive effect remains, the rule of reason analysis will be applied.159  
As naked price fixing is facially anticompetitive, however, the Agencies 
will also truncate the rule of reason test and, therefore, not “intensively” 
inquire into efficiency-enhancing factors or analyze the particular 
industry but, rather, directly challenge the clause.160
Thus, the only clear evaluation is in the extremes.  Clearly 
anticompetitive restraints are challenged under the per se rule; clearly 
pro-competitive restraints will not be challenged according to the 
(truncated) rule of reason.  The majority of clauses will not be that 
easily categorized, however.  Thus, for the majority of clauses, the 
discretion of the Agencies remains such as to leave the undertakings 
with almost no legal certainty. 
The safety zones introduced in the Guidelines are of little help.  The 
discretion the Agencies allow themselves by disregarding the safety 
zones in undefined “extraordinary circumstances” is but one issue.  
156. With regards to innovation markets the test applies as follows:  if four or more 
independently controlled entities, in addition to the parties to the licensing arrangement, 
possess the required specialized assets or characteristics and the incentive to engage in 
research and development that is a close substitute of the research and development activities 
of the parties to the agreement, an agreement affecting innovation markets will not be 
challenged in absence of any facially anticompetitive restraints.  See id. at 23. 
157. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 3.4, at 16. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. 
160. See id. 
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Even in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the safety zones are 
subject to the problems of market-share analysis set out above.161  
Regarding the “four-plus” test in innovation markets, this becomes 
especially obvious.  Research and development is kept secret for the 
most part.  Besides the difficulty of identifying possible other research 
facilities (as new and small ones might be set up rather inconspicuously), 
undertakings will also have to determine the substitutability of the 
technologies including cost and (hypothetical market-) price 
assessments. 
These hurdles are so high that it appears likely most undertakings 
planning an IP-license agreement will follow the Agencies’ suggestion 
and ask for a preliminary evaluation.  While on the one hand this 
“service” of the Agencies might be applauded, it could also be critically 
judged:  by this means the Agencies develop the degree of monopolistic 
decision power and control that in the EU has led to the current 
legislation.  The possibility of subsequent review by the courts offers 
limited consolation.  The Agencies’ opinion will carry major weight for 
most undertakings and might have a deterrent effect in the decision 
whether to ask for judicial review.  This weight of first opinion might 
also “spill over” into the courts, thus furthering an antitrust bias in IP-
license evaluation.162
The preliminary review furthermore runs up costs not only for the 
administration but also for the undertakings which might have to 
comply with additional standards, calculate waiting time, and possibly 
further negotiations both with the Agencies and with each other.  
Additional costs occur in the case of subsequent judicial review.  These 
costs and especially the time factor might have stifling effects on 
innovation the Agencies have not accounted for. 
D. Comparison 
A comparison of the TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines is 
possible on different levels.  First, the focus will be the formal setup of 
both bodies of rules.  Then, a look is cast on the TTBER’s and Antitrust 
Guidelines’ content.  Lastly, again on a more formal level, the broader 
institutional context from which both documents emerge will be 
revisited. 
161. Compare infra Part I.B.4.a. 
162. See also William Kovacic, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property:  
Redefining the Role of Competition Agencies, ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT, EU 
AND US PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 (Francois Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005). 
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1. Formal Setup and Binding Force 
The TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines both approach IPR 
licensing as an antitrust problem. They cover the same subject matter—
patents, copyrights, know-how, and trade secrets.163  Apart from that, 
both sets of rules at first glance seem to be worlds apart. 
The first difference is, of course, that the TTBER is secondary 
legislation of the EU.  As such, it is binding for member states and takes 
direct effect on undertakings as well.  If, for instance, undertakings in 
their license agreement fixed resale prices, the entire agreement would 
de jure be void.  On the other hand, the Commission is bound as well.  It 
cannot charge undertakings for antitrust violations if they act in 
accordance with the TTBER.  The Antitrust Guidelines, on the other 
hand, describe only a likely outcome of an evaluation.  The Agencies 
are in no way bound.164  Nevertheless, it is not perceivable why the 
Agencies or the courts would randomly depart from the Guidelines in 
their evaluations of license agreements.  Unless the Agencies had 
previously announced a change of policy, an undertaking’s good faith 
reliance on and compliance with the Antitrust Guidelines would 
therefore probably result in judicial protection of their settled 
expectations.165  Thus, a de facto binding effect of the Antitrust 
Guidelines exists.  Therefore, the level of legal certainty or “binding 
force” is, after all, not that different.166
A difference appears to exist in the legal “mechanism” by which the 
respective goals are achieved.  From the outset, the Antitrust Guidelines 
do not attempt to give certainty, but rather provide a framework for 
analysis that will be employed equally, though possibly filled differently, 
by the Agencies and undertakings.  The TTBER, on the other hand, 
provides clear-cut rules that should not allow for different 
interpretations by the Commission and undertakings. 
The difference in mechanism seems to stem from the political and 
jurisdictional backgrounds.  The need in the EU to unify the application 
and understanding of antitrust laws does not allow for discretion on the 
163. Differences do exist because of the different national subject matter of the IPRs in 
the EU and different categorizations of, for example, patentable or copyrightable subject 
matter. 
164. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 1.0, at 1 and n.2. 
165. For details on the argument of protected “settled expectations,” see, e.g., 
Christopher D. Pixley, Finding Middle Ground on Federal Retroactive Regulatory 
Lawmaking, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 255 (1999). 
166. A practical difference does exist, however:  it is more difficult to claim protected 
settled expectations than to prove adherence to a statute–here, the TTBER. 
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side of the member states’ authorities.  A comprehensive set of binding, 
harmonized rules was needed.  Furthermore, the objectives of EU and 
U.S. antitrust laws are not identical.  The EU’s antitrust laws prohibit 
agreements that limit trade between member states and promote both 
intra-technology as well as inter-technology competition.  The U.S. 
antitrust laws, on the other hand, apply to interstate commerce without 
the specific objective to promote it.167
A more practical political reason for these differences is the 
Commission’s belief that administrative costs would be drastically 
reduced by introducing the principle of de jure exceptions to technology-
transfer agreements.168  In this context, it is surprising that the Agencies 
do not share this cost concern and explicitly stress the availability of 
individual business review letters, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 50.6, by the 
Department of Justice and Advisory Opinions of the Federal Trade 
Commission pursuant to 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4.169
In sum, the existing formal differences of the TTBER and the 
Antitrust Guidelines seem to be the result of administrative and 
political necessities.  Despite those differences, both sets of rules 
provide for legal certainty of some degree—a superficial view of 
“binding” TTBER and “non-binding” Antitrust Guidelines falls short of 
the application in reality. 
2. Content 
The content of both the TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines set 
the boundaries in which IPR exploitation is regarded to comply with 
antitrust legislation.  The U.S. and the European assessments are not 
fundamentally different. 
Underlying the TTBER and Antitrust Guidelines is the notion that 
technology licensing, that is, the proliferation of intellectual property, is 
generally pro-competitive.170  A shared general antitrust concern is that 
agreements between competing undertakings (undertakings in a 
horizontal relationship) are more likely to harm competition, thus 
167. See Gilbert, supra note 82, at 13. 
168. See Council Regulation 19/65/EEC, supra note 17. 
169. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4 (2007); see Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 1.0, at 1 and 
n.2. 
170. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 2.0, at 2; TTBER, supra note 4, at Recital 5. 
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justifying harsher scrutiny, than agreements between non-competitors 
(undertakings in a vertical relationship).171
As to specific clauses, obviously a detailed comparison must remain 
incomplete as not all clauses explicitly named in the TTBER are also 
discussed in the Antitrust Guidelines.  Under both sets of rules, the 
“classical” antitrust violations—price-fixing, market-division and 
allocation of markets, and output restraints—are strictly forbidden.  The 
concerns about exclusive licenses in their various forms, grant-back-
clauses, and the like, are also mutual. 
3. Institutional Context 
The treatment of licensing agreements in the TTBER and the 
Antitrust Guidelines is somewhat ambivalent from the very beginning.  
Both the Agencies and the Commission are administrative bodies 
charged with the regulation of general fields of trade, commerce, and 
competition.  With this focus, their evaluation of license contracts is 
necessarily driven by equally general economic and antitrust 
considerations.  IP interests might not be recognized, or at least might 
be less recognized.  While bias might be inherent in the work of any 
specialized agency dealing with an “interface-issue,”172 it appears 
especially problematic in the IP-Antitrust interface.  IP laws sensitively 
balance public and private interests and already include economic 
considerations.  To blindly put antitrust considerations over IP laws 
overemphasizes certain parts of the economic side of the scale (i.e. the 
impact on competition) while neglecting others (e.g., economic “waste” 
such as duplicative inventions)173 thus leading to an imbalance in the 
underlying IP system.  An imbalanced body of law, however, is prone to 
allegations that it lacks justification. 
E. Conclusion 
With the new TTBER, antitrust evaluation of IP licensing in the EU 
has made a substantial step towards the U.S. approach.  In many 
respects TTBER and Antitrust Guidelines are consistent.  Some of the 
171. See generally Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.1.1, at 18; TTBER, supra note 
4, art. 4 (1), (2); see Gilbert, supra note 82, at 3. 
172. See generally, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing 
Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2004) (for discussion on bias of 
specialized agencies). 
173. See Robin Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 399, passim (2003). 
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remaining differences do not necessarily come from different 
substantive evaluations but from the legal background and framework, 
i.e., the respective antitrust laws.174
The question remains if the approach taken by the United States and 
the EU is sensible.  Regulation of IP licenses based on antitrust 
considerations might be flawed for two reasons.  First, it might block the 
view on legitimate interests of IPR owners, and second, it might fall 
short of a proper confinement of IP rights.  It has been suggested above 
that an antitrust-driven evaluation might also unbalance the IP system, 
which could call into question its justification at large.  Therefore, it 
seems necessary to explore alternative ways of IP-license analysis.  To 
this end, the following Part II introduces an IP-driven approach to the 
licensing of IPRs. 
II. IP APPROACH TO IPR LICENSING 
It appears that two problems in the context of IP licensing arise that, 
although they each pose problems in and of themselves, are closely 
intertwined.  One question is if, from an IP perspective, the substance of 
the Antitrust Guidelines or the TTBER have merit.  To that extent, 
some open questions, e.g., in the context of field-of-use clauses have 
been identified.  Generally, the presumptions of possible 
anticompetitive effects resulting from the clauses dealt with in the 
TTBER and Antitrust Guidelines shall not be challenged further, 
however.  It shall be presumed—backed by the almost identical content 
of both bodies of rules—that the clauses identified by the Agencies and 
the Commission are all or almost all likely to be economically 
detrimental. 
It is a second question then that needs to be answered:  Are these 
substantive issues dealt with appropriately?  The antitrust concepts 
might in some cases—especially where the IPR owner is also a major 
market power in the meaning of the antitrust laws—provide for good 
guidance.  However, it has been found before that a general analogy 
from antitrust rules, such as the rule of reason, is misplaced in IP 
licensing cases.175  The underlying problem is that antitrust laws are 
employed to tackle specific issues they are not able to address.  The 
grant of IPRs and their exploitation are so closely connected that the 
interference with one of these parts will necessarily affect the other.  
174. See Gilbert, supra note 82, at 13. 
175. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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Thus, when antitrust laws regulate IPR exploitation, they may easily 
interfere with the substantive grant of the IPR. 
The antitrust laws, although fit to evaluate general trade agreements, 
were not designed to address these intricate problems of IPRs and, 
therefore, lack the tools to adequately solve them.176  If indeed, as the 
Agencies and the Commission themselves state, most licensing 
agreements will be in line with antitrust laws,177 it seems questionable 
that, nevertheless, antitrust rules are provided for the residual amount 
of agreements.  Instead, the problem could be regulated from “within” 
the IP laws and by the specialized agencies (for example, the Patent and 
Trademark Offices) and courts that usually deal with IPRs. 
The current approach entails the danger of unduly limiting or 
redefining the grant of IPRs through the “back door.”  Without express 
alteration of the laws, IPR exploitation is limited by subjecting it to 
antitrust scrutiny.  The prominent approach is also susceptible to 
changes in antitrust laws or policies, as well as the changes that might 
occur in IP legislation.  This “double sensitivity” is troublesome.  
Instead of trying to apply antitrust standards, one should ask whether 
the measures provided by the intellectual property laws as well as 
generally applicable rules of law suffice to find doctrinally coherent and 
yet practical solutions.  Although IP laws are no self-contained regime, 
they are, however, leges speciales when it comes to the rights and duties 
of the IPR owner.178  They are to be considered prior to all other rules of 
law when IPRs, their substance, or the scope of rights they confer are 
determined.  If indeed IP laws provided for sufficient means of 
regulation, additional, or “extra-IP,” mechanisms would be misplaced.  
Thus, the question arises whether the concerns raised by the antitrust 
agencies regarding license agreements can be answered by the IP laws 
themselves. 
The answer to this question is determinative for the institutional 
question it implies:  if antitrust concerns can be adequately accounted 
for in the interpretation of IP laws, what is the appropriate forum to 
deal with these issues?  Are the courts and specialized IP agencies 
176. See Ramsey Hanna, Misusing Antitrust:  The Search for Functional Copyright 
Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 445 (1994). 
177. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.3, at 23; TTBER, supra note 4, at 
Recitals 5, 12. 
178. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND 
ANTITRUST, AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW §1.3b, 1-14 (2002).  “[I]t bears recognizing that patents and other intellectual 
property rights limit the reach of the antitrust laws.”  Id. 
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equally or better capable of dealing with the very special antitrust issues 
so as to ensure the concerns are addressed properly?  And even if all 
these questions are answered in the affirmative, it still has to be 
answered why the derivation from the present approach would be 
desirable. 
A. Adequate Recognition of Antitrust Concerns in IP Law Interpretation 
Antitrust laws aim to protect free competition, which is supposed to 
lead to a maximum variety of goods and services available to the public 
at the lowest possible price.179  To determine if these public interest 
considerations are already acknowledged or can be acknowledged in 
IPR analysis, relevant general rules and principles of law are to be taken 
into account.180  But not only the underlying justifications of the 
intellectual property law regimes, also the property aspect of IPRs can 
be analyzed for its impact on the interpretation of IP laws. 
1. Acknowledgement of Public Interests in IP Laws. 
IPRs are granted to promote the sciences and useful arts for the 
overall benefit of the public.181  The general notion of “public interest,” 
therefore, already lies at the heart of all IP laws and forms a common 
basis for both antitrust and IP laws.  To meet the objective of overall 
public benefit, IP laws set up a system that carefully balances the 
(economic) incentives granted to the IPR owner with the potential 
economic harm that is inherent in the exclusivity of the rights conferred, 
e.g., economic “waste” created by duplicative inventive activity or 
overproliferation of IPRs.182  These potential economic harms are 
“balanced off” with the statutory limitations of IPRs,183 namely the 
limitations of the duration and the scope of the rights IP laws grant.  
Through these statutory limitations, it is ensured that the maximum 
amount of expressions and inventions are available in the public domain 
as soon as possible without questioning the basic justification of IPRs. 
In addition to these “statutory” public interest considerations, U.S. 
courts have created the misuse doctrine as an additional mechanism to 
179. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 178 § 1.3, at 1-12, citing WARD BOWMAN, JR., 
PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW:  A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL (1973). 
180. The applicability of general rules of law has also been acknowledged by the U.S. 
Supreme Court as early as 1917.  See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 513. 
181. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
182. See Feldman, supra note 173, at 431. 
183. See  id. at 436. 
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police abuses of IPRs.184  Frischmann and Moylan have identified and 
labeled three different functions of this doctrine.185  In its corrective 
function, the misuse doctrine can fill legislative gaps that cannot 
otherwise be filled by statutory interpretation.186  This corrective 
function focuses on the internal coherence of IP laws187 and provides 
boundaries for the exercise of IPRs in that it prohibits the expansion of 
these rights beyond their lawful scope.188  The misuse doctrine also 
serves a coordinating function, which aims to reconcile inter-statutory 
relationships, i.e., the relation between different IP statutes or IP 
statutes and other bodies of law as the antitrust laws.189  The misuse 
doctrine provides courts with a dynamic tool to develop rules at the 
interface of otherwise static statutes.  In this function the misuse 
doctrine can prevent IPRs from being utilized to undermine 
competition.190  Lastly, the misuse doctrine serves as a safeguard 
mechanism to maintain the balance of interests and preserve the public 
policies underlying the statutory schemes.191  This safeguarding function 
is therefore concerned with the integrity of the IP system as such.192
Through its corrective means, the misuse doctrine can address public 
policy considerations in the IP laws themselves, e.g., acknowledge newly 
discovered (competitive or economic) harms or newly discovered 
interests of IPR owners and rebalance the IP system.  The coordinating 
function allows the direct introduction of antitrust concerns in an IP 
analysis.  In conjunction with the statutory limitations of IPRs, IP laws 
therefore provide measures to deal with the interface of IPRs and 
antitrust issues.  If those means were fully and adequately employed,193 
184. HOVENKAMP, supra note 178 § 3.1, 3-12. 
185. Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of 
Copyright Misuse:  A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 865, 872 (2000). 
186. Id. at 872-73. 
187. Id. at 874. 
188. HOVENKAMP, supra note 178, § 3.2a, 3-6. 
189. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 185, at 875 et seq. 
190. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 178, § 3.2a, at 3-7. 
191. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 185, at 877. 
192. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 178, § 3.2c, 3-8. 
193. It has to be kept in mind that “misuse” is usually seen as an affirmative defense.  
See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 48 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 483, 523 (2006) (which would limit its use to very specific applications); see 
Tom W. Bell, Codifying Copyright’s Misuse Defense, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 573.  The point here 
is, however, that the underlying rationales are generally available. 
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an external antitrust-specific approach to IP licensing would seem 
unnecessary.194
2. Public Interest Considerations Through “Property” Notion of IPRs 
The misuse doctrine is very specific to the U.S. jurisdiction, which, in 
this context, would leave the EU perspective on the treatment of IP 
licenses under antitrust laws unaltered.195  In addition, even in the 
United States the misuse doctrine is only partially settled and partly still 
contested.196  Therefore, the availability of a more universal alternative 
approach to introduce public interest considerations into IPR analysis 
should be examined.  Such an approach could be found in the 
contention that intellectual property is essentially equal to any other 
form of property.197
On this underlying presumption, the following hypothesis can be 
based:  If the grant of (tangible) property rights is subject to public 
interest considerations, and tangible and intellectual property are 
essentially equal, IPRs must be subject to public interest considerations 
as well.  If then, through this property notion, the public interests 
protected by antitrust laws can be acknowledged in the interpretation of 
IP laws, an “external” antitrust-driven approach would be superfluous. 
Property is inherently relational.  It is embedded in the social 
relations among individuals on the one hand and the individual’s or 
property owner’s relation to the state as grantor and protector of 
property on the other hand.198  This “relationality” and the allocative 
effects of private property199 render it subject to restrictions.  On a 
constitutional level, European Constitutions as well as the U.S. 
Constitution provide for a restriction in the form of provisions allowing 
for expropriation.200  This restriction on property can generally only be 
194. The adequate recognition is directly tied to the institutional question, i.e., if the IP 
agencies and courts are an adequate or even better forum for such decisions.  See infra Part 
II.C. 
195. Although similar results could be achieved in the EU via general civil law 
doctrines.  See, e.g., for Germany, C. CIV. [Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch] § 242, generally 
prohibiting the misuse of rights. 
196. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 185, at 867-68. 
197. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property through a Property 
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2004) and passim; Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.0, at 
2. 
198. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 283-85 (2006). 
199. See GREGORY ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROPERTY 5 (2006). 
200. Id. at 6. 
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justified by a public need and is conditioned on compensation.201  This 
limitation to property is—although based on public policy 
considerations—only relevant in relation to the state as a mediator of 
public interests, however.  Private parties can generally not trigger 
expropriation measures to their benefit.202  Therefore, expropriation for 
purposes of this Article can only serve as one example of the limitations 
of property rights without particular regard to antitrust-specific public 
interest limitations. 
It is the sub-constitutional limitations, therefore, that must be 
examined.  The use of tangible property, although undisputedly an 
absolute right conferring the power to exclude,203 is firstly subject to the 
conflicting rights of others.  It is part of the aforementioned 
“relationality” of property that the exercise of property rights may not 
interfere with or violate proprietary positions of third parties.204  
Easements, servitudes, or the laws of nuisance are general examples of 
legal limitations of property rights induced by social or public policy 
considerations.205
On a more concrete note, courts have considered social obligations 
to limit the use of property in the so-called “rent cases.”  It was held that 
the quasi-monopolistic position of the landlords, which gave them 
power over their tenants, e.g., to increase rents at will, was to be 
limited.206  The Supreme Court has stated that as “space . . . is 
necessarily monopolized in comparatively few hands,” public interest 
justified “some degree of public control.”207  If no public control was 
201. Id. at 6-7. 
202. Although companies have sometimes indirectly triggered expropriations by 
threatening to move their operations, for example, if they did not get additional land to 
expand their businesses.  Authorities were then inclined to expropriate, claiming that the 
creation of new jobs, increase in tax revenues, etc., through the respective business was a 
legitimate public use, justifying the taking.  This practice has been upheld by courts.  See, e.g., 
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005). 
203. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1979); Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). 
204. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887).  “[A]ll property in this country is 
held under the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it shall not be injurious to the 
community.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
205. See Carrier, supra note 197. 
206. See generally Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155-57 (1921). 
207. Id. 
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imposed, the right holder could not only use, but also freely abuse, his 
power to the detriment of those dependent on him.208
IP-licensing cases provide for a situation comparable to the rent 
cases.  While a certain good—the intellectual property—is monopolized, 
the potential demand is numerous, thus giving the IP owner seemingly 
unlimited power over the demanders.  Thus, a certain degree of public 
control, i.e., the consideration of public interests to limit the exercise of 
IPRs, is justified.209
The public interests antitrust laws aim to protect—the greatest 
possible variety of goods and services for the lowest possible price—can 
therefore be factored in a genuine IPR analysis.  It seems that from this 
perspective, recourse to antitrust law seems both unnecessary and 
methodologically questionable.210
B. Testing the Assumptions 
It has been suggested that IP laws provide for different “internal” 
means to protect the public against excessive use or exploitation by the 
IP owner.  First, the misuse doctrine was introduced to provide a “door” 
through which antitrust concerns could enter IP law analysis.  Where 
misuse doctrines are unavailable or not clearly applicable, the 
“property” notion inherent in IP, especially the “social function” of 
property has been suggested to allow for another possibility to take 
antitrust concerns into account. 
208. The situation concerning IPRs might be slightly different, as IPRs are generally 
not crucial to survive (as is living space).  However, in case of key patents or interface 
patents, the detriment of the licensee is comparable. 
209. See also Block, 256 U.S. at 157 (McKenna, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the 
application of the Court’s reasoning to all forms of property).  “If the public interest may be 
concerned, as in the statute under review, with the control of any form of property, it can be 
concerned with the control of all forms of property.”  Id.  See also Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 
976.  “We are of the view, . . . that . . . copyright and patent law serve parallel public 
interests,” and “[t]he need…to protect its investment does not outweigh the public’s right 
under our system to expect competition and the benefits which flow therefrom.”  Id. at 976-
78; Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1974) (stating that copyrights 
“must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability . . . for the general 
public good.”). 
210. This view stands in diametrical contrast to the Agencies’ analysis.  See Antitrust 
Guidelines, supra note 3, at 3.  That is not to say that intellectual property is in all respects the 
same as any other form of property.  Intellectual property has important characteristics, such 
as ease of misappropriation, that distinguish it from many other forms of property.  These 
characteristics can be taken into account by standard antitrust analysis, however, and do not 
require the application of fundamentally different principles.  Id. 
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The question now is how this alternative IP-driven approach 
addresses the concerns expressed in the TTBER and the Antitrust 
Guidelines. 
1.  Example 1—Same Results (Price Fixing) 
Both TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines strictly prohibit price 
fixing as a hardcore restriction and per se violation of antitrust laws.211  
From an IP-law perspective, forcing the licensee to charge his customers 
a certain price, i.e., fixing prices on the resale level of the licensed IP or 
the product produced with the IP, is beyond the scope of the IPR grant 
as well.  While it is the IPR owner’s choice to license the IPR at 
whatever price he wishes, his monetary interests are satisfied upon 
licensing.  There is no right embedded in the IPR to control the further 
marketing or sales.  Thus neither TTBER nor the Antitrust Guidelines 
would be needed to eliminate such licensing terms.  The same result 
would be achieved by interpretation of the relevant IP laws, in this case 
even without further use of the misuse doctrine. 
2.  Example 2–Different Results (Use of Licensee’s Technology) 
Article 5(2) TTBER forbids restrictions on the licensee to exploit his 
own technology where the parties are non-competitors.212  Since the 
EU’s antitrust law is also concerned with intra-technology competition, 
this rule seems sensible from the antitrust perspective.  Where a licensee 
has enough know-how in the respective industry as well as the relevant 
assets to further innovation, he is a (potential) source of innovation and 
thus competition in the market, which the licensor must not block.  The 
Agencies, on the other hand, would not render such restriction invalid, 
as they do not require an undertaking to create competition in its own 
field.213
If one reads the IP laws as conclusive and per se balanced, following 
the IP approach, such licensing terms could not be enforced.  While 
IPRs confer inter alia the rights to use, to exclude, and to protect against 
abuse of the IPR by third parties, taking influence on licensees’ 
businesses is beyond the legal power the IPR grants.  The protection of 
the IPR does not require any further control over the licensee’s 
activities. 
211. TTBER, supra note 4, art. (2)(a), 4(1)(a); Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 4, § 
5.3. 
212. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 5(2). 
213. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 3.1, at 7. 
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This time, therefore, a mutual IP approach—although in line with 
EU antitrust laws—alters the U.S. antitrust approach.  As it is more 
restrictive than the current approach, the Agencies are unlikely to 
enforce it.  The courts could nevertheless hear a case and could find the 
license agreement unenforceable because of undue expansion of the 
IPR’s scope.  On the other hand, they would be able to take into 
account the specific interests of U.S. antitrust laws and hold that such 
restriction of the licensee does not run counter to antitrust principles or 
public policies and thus does not amount to misuse within the meaning 
of the respective statutes. 
C. Implications of the IP Approach 
The established antitrust-based regulation of IP licenses has 
produced workable results.  Nevertheless, this Article so far suggests 
that there might be a better solution—the reform or adaptation of the 
IP Agencies’ and courts’ work.214  This Section points at some 
implications of the presumed better solution—the “IP Approach.” 
1. General Benefits 
Example 2 has shown one possible benefit of the proposed 
approach:  strict application leads to results that are coherent with the 
scope of IPRs while also satisfying the stricter of two antitrust regimens.  
It allows enough flexibility, however, to take into account a lower 
standard of antitrust control that in this case allowed for an 
“overreaching” exploitation of the IPR.  The new approach suggests 
other benefits, too.  From a doctrinal point of view, it seems beneficial 
to solve issues that are provoked by the exercise of IPRs, i.e., licensing, 
with the tools provided by the IP laws.  Thereby it is ensured that in 
dealing with the complicated interface issues the IP interests are 
properly construed and acknowledged as well as confined. 
2. Institutional Implications 
It has been argued above and elsewhere that any solution of the 
“interface-dilemma” must reach beyond the mere balancing of 
economic interests inherent in antitrust cases.215  It is important to 
acknowledge and further the balance of interests Congress or the other 
legislative bodies have made in passing the IP laws, while adapting IP 
214. See  also Kovacic, supra note 162, at 4.  
215. See  Feldman, supra note 173, at 400. 
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laws (and their application) to today’s realities.  The antitrust 
agencies—despite their statements in the Antitrust Guidelines and the 
TTBER—are neither particularly experienced in “IP-thinking” nor do 
they have a genuine interest in preserving the IPR system.216  They alone 
are not fit to perform such adaptation.  If IPR interpretation in the field 
of licensing is left to them, soon a mere economic-driven approach will 
be likely to appear.  Due to their highly specialized expertise, they are 
prone to overlook genuine IP issues they are not familiar with.217
IP licensing occurs in quickly changing technological environments.  
To understand the technologies a constant update in knowledge is 
necessary.  The economic considerations driving 
antitrust/anticompetition policies in comparison are rather static.  The 
IP Agencies (e.g., the PTOs), by their everyday work, are exposed to 
the latest changes in the industries and therefore, “automatically” kept 
up to date.  For the Antitrust Agencies, on the other hand, timely and 
costly constant knowledge updates would be necessary to enable them 
to make sensible and informed decisions.  Without such knowledge 
updates, however, the recognition of the IPR owners’ and the public’s 
interests in the application of IP laws is threatened.218
It is due to these dynamics (static economic policy developments vs. 
fast-changing technologies) that the institutions dealing with IPRs right 
now—the PTOs, national agencies in Europe, and the courts—seem to 
be better suited to govern the licensing of IPRs.  They have the 
expertise in IP law without being particularly biased either towards 
antitrust concerns or towards IPRs.219  They are, on the other hand, far 
from oblivious to overreaching exploitation of IPRs.  They are used to 
dealing with cases of misuse or other unlawful IPR exercise.  It is easier 
for them to acknowledge or stress certain competition concerns in the 
analyses they are used to performing than it is to instruct an antitrust 
agency and have it obey the intricacies of IP laws.  Thus, it appears that 
the IP Agencies and courts are best equipped to calibrate the IP system 
to account for antitrust concerns that licensing activities might raise.220
216. Id. at 401.  See also Kovacic, supra note 162, at 1. 
217. Id. at 1. 
218. See Feldman, supra note 173, passim. 
219. See Dreyfuss, supra note 172, at 770 (describing how initial concerns about a pro-
patentee bias of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit abated.  There is no conceivable 
reason why this should be different for other specialized IP agencies or courts.). 
220. See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Patent Ships Sail an Antitrust Sea, 30 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 395, 402 (2007). 




The new suggestion further seems to be more cost efficient.  In the 
current system, the parties to a licensing agreement as well as the 
Agencies incur costs through the administrative review proceedings and 
possibly additional litigation.  In the proposed setting, only costs from 
litigation occur.  As these costs are borne by parties, this seems to be a 
natural limitation on the number of suits brought.  This self-restraint 
entails positive effects for competition and economy in general:  while 
anticompetitive licensing may still occur, insignificant restraints will go 
untried as the parties are not willing to bear the costs and risks of a 
lawsuit.  Major restraints will be tried, however.  By this “natural 
selection,” the specialized agencies and the courts are made aware of 
the actual challenges to IP laws and can sensibly react.  While serving as 
an indicator of the nuisances in IP laws, the public bears lesser costs due 
to reduced government activity. 
The suggested approach does bear costs, as well.  The incorporation 
of antitrust analysis in the IP Agencies’ and courts’ procedures and 
analyses is possible only if those bodies’ economic expertise is 
strengthened.  This entails education, hiring new staff, and possibly 
structural changes that produce costs.221  These costs, for the most part, 
seem to be one-time costs, however.  Once changes are implemented 
only very limited further “time-to-time” training will be needed to 
educate officials about the latest relevant economic ideas.  As has been 
pointed out above, economic theories are less likely to change, so that 
related educational expenses do not seem to present a major concern. 
D. Conclusion 
The hypothesis that antitrust concerns in the context of IPR 
licensing could adequately be addressed by the IP laws themselves 
without recourse to antitrust mechanism raised the question which 
institutional implications such an approach might have.  It has been 
suggested that an institutional change away from the antitrust agencies 
to the specialized IP agencies and courts is needed.  While this 
suggestion entails costs, it was argued that in the long term, regulation 
of IP licensing through the IP agencies and courts would be both 
cheaper as well as preferable from a doctrinal point of view. 
221. See Dreyfuss, supra note 172, at 792. 
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SUMMARY AND FINAL REMARKS 
This Article did not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
all possible licensing terms in all possible settings of undertakings and 
markets.  By examining the Antitrust Guidelines and the TTBER, it 
showed different things, however.  First, that two major jurisdictions 
share mutual antitrust concerns in the context of IPR licensing.  Second, 
both jurisdictions tackle the perceived problem through their specialized 
antitrust mechanisms and agencies. 
This perception and approach has been criticized.  While the 
substantive concerns as present in the TTBER and Antitrust Guidelines 
purposely remained basically unchallenged, the institutional setting has 
been questioned.  It has been suggested that the issues (if correctly or 
not) identified are better dealt with by agencies and courts specialized in 
dealing with IPRs.  It has been shown that the concerns underlying and 
driving antitrust policy can be accounted for under regular IP analysis.  
Thus, for doctrinal and cost-efficiency reasons, it was argued that the 
evaluation of IPR licensing agreements should be transferred to a 
different forum—the specialized IP Agencies and courts. 
A question not dealt with in this Article is the implementation of the 
suggestions set forth.  It seems possible, however, in the United States 
to revoke the Antitrust Guidelines and, as the case may be, establish 
new procedural rules.  In the EU, the TTBER could also be revoked or 
simply not renewed once it expires.222  To the extent that the TTBER 
has led to adaptations of national antitrust laws, these adaptations 
possibly need to be changed. 
 
222. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 11, (stating that the regulation is limited in time and 
expires April 30, 2014). 
